

# Economic and Social Outsiders but Political Insiders: Sweden's Populist Radical Right

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We study the politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats, a major populist radical-right party. Based on detailed administrative data, we present the first comprehensive account of which politicians are selected into such a party. Surveys show that politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats share strong anti-establishment and anti-immigration attitudes that drastically set them apart from Sweden's other parties. Searching for individual traits that link naturally to these attitudes, we classify the universe of Swedish politicians and voters by social and economic marginalization and exposure to immigration. Politicians from the Sweden Democrats over-represent marginalized groups without strong attachments to the labour market or to traditional nuclear families, which instead are under-represented among politicians in all other parties. Among voters, the Sweden Democrats have higher electoral support in precincts with higher shares of the same marginalized groups. We see the mobilization of the marginalized as an important driver of the party's success. Finally, we uncover that Sweden-Democrat politicians score lower on a number of valence traits than other-party politicians. In sum, the rise of the Sweden Democrats raised political representation for marginalized groups, but this came at a valence cost.

*Key words:* Political selection, Radical right, Populism.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades, many developed democracies have seen a strengthening of populist radical-right parties, a trend which manifests itself across continents and electoral systems. Such

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parties and politicians are visible throughout Europe. They are also resurging in Australia, Israel, Japan, as well as on other continents. Populist radical-right elements currently take part—or have recently taken part—in the governments of Austria, Brazil, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and the US (Rydgren, 2018).

These trends are potentially alarming as these parties share anti-establishment and anti-immigrant political platforms that sometimes threaten core values of liberal democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). The populist radical-right wave *cum* threat is arguably the most important global political phenomenon in the last two decades. However, if representative democracies manage to adjust the supply of parties to changing popular demands, new populist radical-right parties might provide political representation to specific—perhaps neglected—segments of society (Kaltwasser, 2012; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Sandel, 2020). This could address the representation demands without risking a change in basic liberal-democratic rules. To assess this possibility, we ought to study who these parties represent, who provides the representation, and whether this representation creates important trade-offs.

One way to shed light on these issues is to study which groups of people are more likely to engage with the populist radical right. Given its anti-establishment stance (the populism part), it is natural to consider people who are economically or socially marginalized in society, and thus excluded from the establishment. Given its anti-immigrant stance (the radical-right part), it is natural to consider people who are exposed to high levels of immigrant presence and competition in economic and social domains. Such reasoning has led several scholars to study voter support for populist radical-right parties from groups that have experienced economic grievances or immigration shocks (see, among others, Knigge, 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mutz, 2018; Dehdari, 2022; Norris and Inglehart, 2019).<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1. *Our contribution*

We believe that our article makes the following four contributions.

First, previous research has focused on voter mobilization and abstracted from politicians. This is a major gap in the literature. Without knowing about politicians, we cannot even begin to characterize which political representation populist radical-right parties might offer. In this article, we close this gap by studying populist radical-right politicians in Sweden with extremely rich individual data. Our most important contribution is thus to provide the first comprehensive account of political selection into a major populist radical-right party: the Sweden Democrats. As we forge this account, we study the resulting representation pattern by linking the party's politicians and voters.<sup>2</sup>

Second, the data allow us to match the actual traits of politicians against a prominent populist radical-right narrative. In one part, this narrative holds that traditional parties are made up by elites, who are out of touch with reality and have little in common with people without political representation (Mansbridge and Macedo, 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019)—“the forgotten people” as prior US President Donald Trump liked to call them. In the narrative's

1. The literature on the Radical Right is vast. As of February 2020, Kai Arzheimer's bibliography on the Radical Right in Western Europe alone stood at 907 articles (<http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/extreme-right-western-europe-bibliography>). Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) survey the even broader literature on populism.

2. This focus on the selection of politicians into a populist radical-right party also sets the contribution in this article clearly apart from our own previous research on general selection patterns in Swedish politics (see Dal Bó, Finan, Folke, Persson and Rickne, 2017). Our supply-side analysis at the level of individual politicians also sets the paper apart from other notions of the supply of populism. For example, the supply measure proposed in Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno (2017) is at the party level (and based on whether a party appears in the European Social Survey, which is related to its voter support).

other part, populist radical-right politicians claim to (truly) represent those outsiders and back these claims by appeals to shared characteristics, a practice sometimes labelled as “identity politics”. Our second contribution is to empirically examine this narrative—at least, the part about radical-right politicians. Thus, we use our rich individual data to identify various outsider groups and check whether these indeed constitute a nexus of representation and support for the Sweden Democrats.

Third, our focus on various outsider groups rhymes well with the anti-establishment doctrine of populist radical-right parties. But, it does not directly go along with their anti-immigrant doctrine. To directly address the latter, we consider various groups that are particularly exposed to immigration. Our third contribution is to study individual mobilization into Sweden's populist radical right among those who are the most marginalized in society and the most exposed to immigration. In other words, we base our empirical examination of the groups that join the Sweden Democrats on the two main tenets of its platform.

Fourth, some scholars see support for populist radical-right parties as symptomatic of eroded trust in the political system, often following economic shocks (see Dustmann, Eichengreen, Otten, Sapir, Tabellini and Zoega (2017) as well as Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) and references therein). In theory, such distrust can promote the selection of “citizen candidates”—only people with congruent policy interests due to shared traits can credibly represent a group (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). But if the increased representation of aggrieved groups involves politicians with fewer qualifications, then the rise of the radical right may come at a valence cost. Our fourth contribution is to study whether the rise of the Sweden Democrats created a tension between representation and valence.

## 1.2. *Outline and main results*

Let us describe the plan and contents of the article. Section 2 begins by describing our data sources. These include a rich yearly panel of administrative data (1979–2012), with detailed economic and social traits for the whole population, including all (elected and unelected) politicians, for all parties, in all elections since 1982. But, we also draw on two novel surveys designed to elicit attitudes and preferences from politicians and voters, using (*verbatim*) the same questions. After providing some necessary background information on Swedish elections, we then briefly describe the Sweden Democrats—the target of our study—a party that went from little political presence in 2002 to Sweden's third largest in 2014. We show that the Sweden Democrats is indeed a populist radical-right party: its voters *and* politicians share strong anti-establishment and anti-immigration views, which set them very much apart from voters and politicians of other parties.

Section 3 starts out from the Sweden Democrat's distinctive platform and prior work in sociology and social psychology. From this stepping stone, we motivate and precisely define two sets of individual traits as natural prospective sources of political mobilization. (1) *Outsider status* appeals mainly to the party's anti-establishment stance. Under this heading, we identify groups of people whose individual traits make them weakly attached to central economic or social institutions, or who grew up in families with such weak attachments. (2) *Immigration exposure* appeals to the party's anti-immigrant stance. Here, we identify groups whose traits make them more exposed to immigration than the median Swede in different domains. In the end, we construct eleven categories along which to track party membership.

Section 4 focuses on who becomes a Sweden-Democrat politician at the municipal level, our core object of investigation. We find that Sweden-Democrat politicians over-represent groups with outsider status, relative to the overall population. This stands in stark contrast to *all* other political parties, including the left, which under-represent those groups. The same patterns are not found—at least not to the same extent—for groups with high immigration exposure. Running a

statistical horse-race, with machine-learning methods, among our 11 candidate groups to predict who is a Sweden-Democrat politician, the top four groups indeed refer to different forms of economic and social outsider status. To cut down on taxonomies, we focus on the four outsider groups in the remainder of the article.

Section 5 begins by studying the Sweden-Democrat voting support across electoral precincts. We find similar patterns as for politicians: on average, the Sweden Democrats receive distinctively higher vote shares in precincts where a higher share of voters belong to the four chosen outsider groups. Then, the section investigates the specific time path of the electoral support for the Sweden Democrats. Using simple graphs and (reduced-form) shift-share regressions, we document that rising local vote shares for the party coincide with rising local disposable-income gaps between labour-market outsiders and insiders driven by a 2006–10 sequence of national austerity reforms. Likewise, Sweden Democrat local vote shares are closely related to local unemployment gaps between insiders with risky and safe jobs driven by national unemployment gaps in the 2008–11 financial crisis. While these associations are quite striking, it is difficult to establish causality.

Section 6 takes stock of the earlier results. We first interpret the similar patterns for politicians and voters in the context of citizen-candidate models in economics and descriptive-representation ideas in political philosophy. Then, we document that the increased representation of outsider groups following the rise of the Sweden Democrats did entail a cost of valence in various dimensions. The emerging tradeoff between representation and valence weakens the “inclusive meritocracy” documented in our previous work on Swedish politicians (Dal Bó *et al.*, 2017).

Section 7 concludes the article. Supplementary Appendix collects auxiliary material on data and empirical results.

## 2. DATA AND BACKGROUND

In this section, we first describe the data sources used for our analysis. Then, we provide a minimal background on Sweden’s electoral institutions. We briefly describe the Sweden Democrats’ history, ideological stance, voter support, and policy orientation. Finally, we show that the party is indeed a populist radical-right party, with its politicians and voters holding anti-establishment and anti-immigrant attitudes that are very distinct from those in Sweden’s other parties.

### 2.1. *Data sources*

**2.1.1. Register data.** Our empirical analysis is entirely based on individual-level data (except for vote shares, which come aggregated at the level of the electoral precinct, and for some analyses, municipality). One important dataset encompasses all elected and unelected individual candidates running for national or municipal political office between 1982 and 2014.<sup>3</sup> Altogether, our data include more than 200,000 unique politicians, over 50,000 of whom have been elected at least once. Vote shares for every party in every election are linked to our dataset from records kept by the Swedish Electoral Agency.

We link these politician data to several administrative registers from Statistics Sweden for the adult population (everybody aged 16 years or older). For most variables, our data hold annual records from 1979 to 2012 for everybody in the entire population, altogether about 14 million unique men and women. Thus, we can precisely characterize how the traits of politicians compare to those in the entire population. By aggregation, we can also characterize how the traits of voters in different precincts compare to one another.

3. Prior to every election, each political party must report its ordered list with a personal identification code for each politician. These lists are kept by Statistics Sweden or (in some cases) by regional electoral authorities. After the election, another record is created with a complete list of all elected politicians from each party.

The data contain precise information on demographic, social, and economic variables (e.g. age, sex at birth, international region of birth, voting precinct of residence, civic status, education level, industrial sector, and occupation). They also include various sources of annual income, including labour income and social-welfare benefits. In addition to their voting precinct, we know people's area of residence divided by the small-area market statistics (SAMS), which we use to define neighbourhoods. The whole of Sweden is divided into approximately 9,000 SAMS areas with an average population of approximately 2,000 persons for Stockholm and 1,000 persons for the rest of Sweden.

The Multigenerational Register identifies parent–child relations (we use only biological parents). As the income data begin in 1979, it is truncated. Nevertheless, we observe parental income from various sources in 1985 for 55% of politicians elected after 2002, and parental civic status when the politician is 18 years old for 35%.

**2.1.2. Survey data.** We supplement these various registers with a variety of surveys. Of special note is the 2017 KOLFU survey directed to the universe of current local politicians by a subset of the authors, in collaboration with political scientists from the University of Gothenburg (Karlsson and Gilljam, 2017). It had a response rate of close to 70% and asked numerous questions about preferences, motivations, and personality traits (see Section 6 below). In the same year, the SOM survey, conducted together with another set of Gothenburg political scientists, posed a subset of the same questions (*verbatim*) to a random sample of Swedish voters together with questions about their party sympathies (Andersson, Carlander, Lindgren and Oskarson, 2018).

## 2.2. *Elections and the Sweden Democrats*

**2.2.1. Swedish elections.** Every 4 years, Sweden runs elections at the level of 290 municipalities, 20 counties, and the nation. All these elections take place on the second Sunday in September with a turnout between 80 and 90%. In each election, citizens cast a separate party ballot, a ranked list with a large number of candidates. Based on the results, 13,000+ municipal councilors, 1,100 county councilors, and 349 members of parliament are appointed.

In Sweden's proportional-representation system, seat shares in the municipal councils and the national parliament align closely with the vote shares of political parties. Since 1998, voters can also cast an optional preference vote for one candidate. But as only about a third of all voters exploit this option, the preference-vote reform only allows a handful of politicians from lower ranks to bypass the party's list order and win a seat.<sup>4</sup>

**2.2.2. History of the Sweden Democrats.** The Sweden-Democrat party was founded in 1988. In its early days, the party was a marginal force in national and local politics. It won political representation for the first time in 1991, with two municipal council seats. The party's national vote share was only about 1 percentage point until 1998, though support was stronger in some regions. The vote share slowly rose to 2.9% in 2006. However, in 2010 the Sweden Democrats doubled the vote share to 5.7% in 2010, crossing the 4% parliamentary threshold. Another major breakthrough was in 2014, when it became the third largest party with a 12.9 percentage-point vote share and considerably higher support in some municipalities. Figure W1

4. This reflects voter "abstention" from the optional vote, a concentration of votes for candidates at the top of the ballot, and high thresholds. See Folke, Persson and Rickne (2016) for a thorough analysis of the preference-vote system and its consequences.

in the Supplementary Appendix illustrates this evolution of the parliamentary vote share as well as the number of seats won by the party at the three levels of Swedish politics.

Despite its recent success—and differently from its sister parties in most other European countries—the Sweden Democrats was generally denied substantial political influence. However, this *cordon sanitaire* was broken after the 2014 election, when the party played an essential role in forming governing coalitions in some municipalities (Aftonbladet, 2014).

The Sweden Democrats have found it difficult to recruit candidates for their party lists, especially during its early success. The traits of the elected and unelected candidates in the Sweden Democrats thus reflect self-selection into the party, more than screening by party leaders.<sup>5</sup> The article focuses on elected candidates, but we show that the main results also hold for merely nominated candidates (see the robustness part of Section 4.2).

**2.2.3. Political platform.** Recent work on European-wide party ideologies has classified the Sweden Democrats as a typical radical-right party (e.g. Rydgren, 2007, 2008) and as part of the populist right (e.g. Van Kessel, 2015; Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

The populist label reflects the clear anti-establishment stance of the party, which has constantly blamed the establishment and political elites for not seeing, and acting on, the problems of ordinary people. The *cordon sanitaire* by other parties has aided this self-portrayal as “friends of the people and, at the same time, sharp critics of a consensual elite” (Hellström and Nilsson, 2010, p. 60).

The radical-right label reflects the strong anti-immigration stance of the party, for which immigration is a signature issue.<sup>6</sup> The experts in the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys rate the Sweden Democrats as very anti-immigrant, compared to the Social Democrats or Conservatives (see Supplementary Appendix Section W1 and Erlingsson, Loxbo and Öhrvall (2012)). For example, the party has argued that (non-white) immigration takes a large toll on the public finances and threatens job prospects for natives.

On the conventional left-right spectrum (typically associated with redistribution and the economic role of the state), the party ranks in between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives (see Supplementary Appendix Figure W2). The party has argued for restoring the welfare state, with both lower taxes and higher social spending, to be financed by savings from reduced immigration.<sup>7</sup>

5. After the 2006 election, the Sweden Democrats was the only party not able to fill all their municipal council seats; and after the 2010 election, the party was unable to fill 57 empty seats, while all other parties combined had only 5 empty seats (Statistics Sweden, 2016b; Poohl, line). In a 2014 survey by Swedish State Television to 1,372 municipal party organizations, 50% of the Sweden Democrat organizations, but just 20% of other parties, reported considerable hardship in candidate recruitment (SVT, line).

6. As described in Widfeldt (2008), the party initially grew out of an organization known as “Keep Sweden Swedish” (Bevara Sverige Svenskt). Over time, the Sweden Democrats moderated their political stance from biological racism towards cultural national chauvinism. They came to argue that social conflicts ensue when people from different cultures attempt to live together (Widfeldt, 2008). In the early 2010s, the party replaced Nationalism with Social Conservatism as its official ideology (Rydgren, 2018).

7. In national politics, the Sweden Democrats have often voted with the centre-right bloc. But their stance on taxes and labour-market issues is more ambiguous. A left-leaning think-tank says that (in 2010–14),

“the Sweden Democrats are ambivalent [on tax issues]. The party wants to spend like a left-wing party, but tax like a right-wing party” (Tiden, 2014).

In municipal politics, the Sweden Democrats have often supported centre-right coalitions on tax cuts and privatization, demanded reduced refugee numbers, and “multi-cultural accounting,” earmarking money spent on natives vs. immigrants (Quensel and Poohl, 2011). However, the party often strives to redirect resources towards elderly care (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2017).

**2.2.4. Who votes Sweden Democrat?** Based on survey data, Sweden-Democrat voters are disproportionately male, working-class, and low-educated (Erlingsson *et al.*, 2012; Sannerstedt, 2014; Oskarsson and Demker, 2015; Jylhä, Strimling and Rydgren, 2018). The party's voters are also less trusting of politicians, political institutions, the court system, and news media than voters of other parties (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2011) (Jylhä *et al.*, 2018).

Earlier research disagrees on whether economic vulnerability drives support for the Sweden Democrats. Dehdari (2022) finds that layoff notifications among low-skilled native workers during the financial crisis raised the Sweden-Democrat vote share in precincts of notified workers. A weak labour-market attachment among the party's voters also shows up in high self-reported support among the unemployed, people on disability insurance, and people on long-term sick leave (Erlingsson *et al.*, 2012; Sannerstedt, 2014; Jylhä *et al.*, 2018). Some scholars argue that as these categories do not make up a majority of the party's voters, economic insecurity cannot be a major driver of the party's rise (Erlingsson *et al.*, 2012; Sannerstedt, 2014, 2015; Jylhä *et al.*, 2018). Section W1 in the Supplementary Appendix discusses these results with regard to survey design and sample stratification.

On a left-to-right scale, Sweden-Democrat voters put themselves somewhere in the middle of the ideological spectrum (Sannerstedt, 2015), consistent with the expert judgments of the party's stance on that scale.<sup>8</sup>

**2.2.5. Party-specific attitudes.** As we have seen, the Sweden Democrats emphasize an anti-establishment *cum* anti-immigrant platform, which is very distinct from the platforms of other parties in Sweden. In our data, we can illustrate quite clearly that this emphasis is supported both by the party's local politicians and its voters. In Figure 1, we plot our survey data, exploiting the fact that politicians and voters were asked exactly the same questions in the 2017 KOLFU and SOM surveys. This unique feature of the data allows us to not just compare views *across* parties but check whether politician and voter attitudes *within* each party are congruent.

The left graph in Figure 1 compares anti-establishment views, measured by stated levels of distrust in the national parliament (see Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou and Passari, 2017 for a similar measurement idea). Average politician views are marked on the horizontal axis and average voter views on the vertical axis. Each party is marked by a circle (with diameter proportional to the 2014 parliamentary vote share). Among other parties—the unfilled circles—only 5–25% of voters and politicians say that their distrust in parliament is high or very high. Among the Sweden Democrats—the filled circle—these numbers are about 60%.

The right graph in Figure 1 compares the anti-immigration views of voters and politicians, measured by their answers to a proposal about reducing refugee immigration. Among voters for parties other parties, only 5–35% see reducing immigration as a very good proposal, as do 2–25% of the other-party politicians. These percentages contrast starkly with those of Sweden-Democrat supporters and politicians. Among supporters, 80% think that restricting refugee immigration is a very good idea and about 90% of the party's politicians agree.

In both graphs, the unfilled and filled markers lie close to the 45-degree line, showing similar attitudes of voters and politicians in each party. Remarkably, the highly congruent views of

8. Data from surveys and exit polls suggest that most voters for the Sweden Democrats would otherwise vote for one of the two strongest parties, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives. Inflows were larger from the Social Democrats between 2006 and 2010 and from the Conservatives between 2010 and 2014 (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2011; Statistics Sweden, 2016a). Another possibility is mobilization via higher turnout (though Swedish turnout, around 85%, is internationally very high). A direct test in our data reveals that turnout did not go up significantly in municipalities where the Sweden Democrats made their largest gains. This evidence is not definitive however, as turnout could have fallen absent the gains of the Sweden Democrats.




FIGURE 1

Anti-immigration and anti-establishment attitudes of elected councilors and self-identified voters for Sweden Democrats and other parties.

*Notes:* The figure shows averages of two attitudes in survey data among politicians (x-axes) and voters (y-axes). Filled circles are averages for Sweden Democrats and unfilled circles are averages for the other seven parties in the Swedish parliament. The left graph shows anti-immigrant preferences, measured as a dummy variable for the opinion that “Reducing refugee immigration” is a “very good proposal”. The right graph shows the proportion who pronounce “high distrust” or “very high distrust” in the national parliament. The voter data is from the 2017 SOM survey ( $N = 1,547$ , whereof 262 Sweden Democrats) and politician data from the 2017 KOLFU survey ( $N = 7,609$ , whereof 483 Sweden Democrats).

Sweden-Democrat voters and politicians strongly diverge from the attitudes held by voters and politicians in all other parties. Politicians of other parties would thus have a hard time to credibly represent voters of the Sweden Democrats in terms of their policy preferences. The filled and unfilled circles are on opposite sides of the 45-degree lines, with Sweden-Democrat (other-party) politicians expressing even stronger (weaker) antipathies than their voters do.

### 3. OUTSIDER STATUS AND IMMIGRATION EXPOSURE

In this section, we motivate and precisely define candidate groups of people whose economic and social traits might make them more likely to engage with the Sweden Democrats, as politicians or voters. These candidate groups revolve around two notions, which we call outsider status and immigration exposure.

#### 3.1. Brief motivation

The findings in Figure 1 make clear that the Sweden Democrats and their voters share views on the establishment and on immigration that are starkly outside of the mainstream of traditional parties.

**3.1.1. Outsider status.** The idea that marginalized individuals in society might be particularly open to an anti-establishment message is intuitive. Indeed, important theoretical work in sociology and social psychology on social identity (Tajfel, 1974) and social dominance



(Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) implies that group cleavages and conflicts can arise if a set of marginalized individuals in a certain dimension see themselves as members of an in-group and more established individuals as members of an out-group. It is not far-fetched to expect such group identification at the bottom of a social hierarchy to raise the appeal of an anti-establishment political program among members of the marginalized group. The general idea of intergroup tensions accommodates hypotheses based on economic insecurity as well as on cultural backlash, to use the labels in Norris and Inglehart (2019).

Of course, marginalized groups may also be particularly attracted to an anti-immigration message that exploits economic and social grievances to paint a conflict between residents and immigrants. Indeed, this has been a common tactic among radical-right parties.<sup>9</sup>

In what follows, we use *outsider status* as a common label for individuals with individual traits that make them marginalized in some social or economic dimension.

Specific appeals to marginalized or outsider groups abound in the literature on populist politics, where leading scholars have argued that political preferences systematically relate to key economic and social circumstances, including labour-market socialization (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 2003; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Martin, Bornschier and Frey, 2006), social background by parental economics status (Inglehart, 1981; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987), and family structure combined with labour-market conditions (Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1997).

**3.1.2. Immigration exposure.** We have seen that anti-immigration policies form another core of the Sweden-Democrat political platform. As discussed in Section 2, the party rhetoric vehemently argues that immigration threatens jobs and welfare programs for natives.<sup>10</sup> It is natural to assume that individuals whose economic or social traits make them more exposed to immigration might be particularly attracted to messages about the crowding out of jobs, social-welfare payments, or other amenities. This would be the case if people form their beliefs about how society works by learning from their local environment as in Piketty (1995). If such local learning is subject to the kind of biases emphasized by Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2016), people who are more-than-average exposed to immigration may also be more persuaded than others of a platform based on stereotypes about immigration threats.<sup>11</sup>

Like for outsiders, we can think about this hypothesis in terms of a tension between an in-group and an out-group. But in this dimension, the Sweden-Democrat political platform appeals to natives, who see themselves as an in-group and (new) immigrants as an out-group.

In what follows, we use *immigration exposure* as a common label for individuals who are more exposed to prospective competition from immigrants in different domains.

Specific examples of how immigration might boost radical-right support are plentiful in the existing literature. Some of this work stresses how immigration shocks might turn voters towards populist radical-right parties, because they want to reduce competition from

9. Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte (2014) and Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno (2020) show that anti-immigrant attitudes in the European Social Survey are associated with economic insecurity. Moreover, the most vulnerable economic groups exaggerate immigrant numbers, which triggers further anti-immigrant sentiments (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2018). Another mechanism is that economic insecurity may cause anger that radical-right parties can turn against cultural out-groups such as immigrants. Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre and Utych (2021) describe this theoretical possibility and give empirical support from observational data and survey experiments.

10. Before the 2010 election, a party commercial featured burka-clad women with strollers winning a running race for the national budget against senior ladies with walkers. The message—a culturally distinct group crowds out support for vulnerable Swedes—could not be clearer. The video was censored by Swedish Public TV, which helped make it viral.

11. Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019) offer a useful model where stereotypical beliefs interact with the mapping between social identities and political preferences: a higher salience of immigration may lead people to choose their identity based on their immigration preferences rather than their social class.




FIGURE 2

Categories in the descriptive analysis of Sweden-Democrat vs. other-party politicians.

immigrants over scarce resources in arenas such as the labour market, housing, welfare benefits, and even the marriage market (Borjas, 1999; Rydgren and Ruth, 2011; Billiet *et al.*, 2014; Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016; Hangartner, Dinas, Marbach, Matakos and Xefteris, 2019).

### 3.2. A classification tree

Informed by this general discussion, we use our detailed data on individual traits to partition individuals into a number of specific groups in a way summarized by the classification tree in Figure 2. The top two branches of this tree reflect our general discussion about who might be attracted by to the central anti-establishment and anti-immigration tenets of the populist radical right. Thus, we first classify individuals based on their outsider status and immigration exposure. Each of these main branches has a set of sub-branches.

Outsider status is defined mainly by marginalization with regard to the labour market and the family, two central economic and social institutions in a country like Sweden. Exploiting our rich data, the classification along this branch includes outsider status, not just of a certain person herself but of her parents during the person's youth. The branch for immigration exposure is also subdivided into sub-branches that reflect different prospective domains of competition: in employment, access to social welfare, and neighborhoods.

The classification tree gives us a descriptive framework to characterize who becomes a Sweden Democrat. The tree has a total of eleven binary categories, seven for outsider status, and four for immigration exposure. The working labels for these categories are highlighted by boldface italicized fonts in the tree. We now describe in detail how to make these classifications operational in our data.

**3.2.1. Outsider status.** *Labour-market outsiders.* Labour-market attachment is key for individual identity in a high-employment society like Sweden. Thus, we consider the possession of a steady job as well as the risk of losing that job. Borrowing from Lindbeck and Snower (1984), we label the loosely attached as *labour-market outsiders* and the tightly attached as *insiders*. Our operational definition relies on the Social Exclusion and Labor Market Attachment (SELMA) framework, developed by sociologists Kindlund and Biterman (2002) and Bäckman and Franzén (2007). An insider is defined as a person whose labour income exceeds 3.5 “basic amounts” (SEK

156,800 in today's prices, about USD 18,700) in each one of the last 3 years.<sup>12</sup> People who do not belong to this category are classified as labour-market outsiders and include those with either no attachment, or a loose attachment, to the labour market. They make up a little more than 35% of the adult, working-age population during our period of analysis. We only exploit the SELMA classification for the working-age population while excluding full-time students as well as people in age-based retirement.

Note that the notion of being a labour-market outsider captures something distinct from just being "poor". In fact, only 2% of the Swedish population meets the EU definition of *absolute* poverty (Statistics Sweden). With a broader *relative* definition, the poor continue to be a minority of the outsiders. The usual definition, an annual disposable income below 60% of the national median, applies to only one in five (19.8%) of the 18+ population. The poor in this sense just make up about one third of those we classify as labour-market outsiders.

*Vulnerable insiders.* Not all insiders share the same labour market. Different workers face different risks of losing their job due to technological change, outsourcing, or general business downturns. To classify workers in this dimension, we again follow earlier research—this time by Autor (2013), Autor and Dorn (2013), and Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014). These scholars distinguish occupations with different Routine Task Intensity (RTI) defined by the typical tasks they entail. Specifically, occupations that require several (few) routine tasks, compared to manual or abstract tasks, have a high (low) RTI. We expect that individuals in such occupations are more exposed in times of high job loss.

How do we identify such individuals in our register data? These data include 2-digit occupation codes for each employed person (translated to ISCO from the Swedish SSK classification). Using the RTI index from Goos *et al.* (2014), we divide all individuals with a 2002–2012 occupational code into two groups. We call those insiders (by the earlier definition) whose occupations have an RTI above the median *vulnerable insiders*, and their below-median counterparts *secure insiders*. Notably, this binary categorization applies only to people who we classified as labour-market insiders.

*Receiving social welfare.* People on social welfare are particularly marginalized in Sweden. Any person who applies for social welfare (*ekonomiskt bistånd*) is subject to a thorough evaluation by the local (municipal) authority. Assistance is only given if other options—like work, government employment programs, social insurance, or loan restructuring—are exhausted. Moreover, the household must forego its wealth, like fixed or liquid assets. About 5% of the working-age population receives some nonzero social welfare payment in our sample period. We set the binary annual indicator for social welfare at 1 if the household receives nonzero welfare payments in the year.

*Single or divorced.* In this classification of family types, we attempt to measure if individuals lack the social connection of a spouse or partner. As sociologists have long emphasized (for a textbook treatment, see e.g. Parsons and Bales (2000)), the traditional living arrangement in modern Western society is the nuclear family. This family type is usually defined as a married (or partnered) couple that currently stays together with their children, or had been staying with them

12. The benchmark amount is updated each year for inflation and used in various Swedish social insurance programs. An income exceeding 3.5 benchmark amounts is expected to cover nearly all full-time jobs in minimum-wage sectors. Only a handful of occupations in the hotel and restaurant services would fall below the cutoff (Social Rapport 2010).

in the past. The first step to forming a nuclear family is entering into partnership or marriage, as opposed to being single or divorced. We use this distinction to define the single or divorced as a less socially established, outsider group. In the register data, we use an existing civil-status variable to identify divorced people, and we approximate singles as those who do not share an address (family ID-code) with a similar-age resident.

*Outsider family background.* Thus far, our groupings speak to an individual's current outsider status. But a less privileged economic or social family background is another key dimension of being a more or less established member of society. Operationally, we classify individuals based on the outsider status of their fathers, measured in 1985. To parallel our earlier indicators for the labour market, we separately identify whether in 1985, the individual's father was a labour-market outsider or received social welfare. We also define whether an individual's parents were no longer married, or no longer living together, when the individual was 18 years of age.

Intuitively, these three measures of economic and social background serve as proxies for whether an individual in her youth had a father with a steady job, whether she grew up in a household on welfare, and whether she was brought up outside of a nuclear family.

**3.2.2. Immigration exposure.** We construct four measures of immigration exposure to capture what the literature has proposed as the main drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes and radical-right support. In each dimension, we classify individuals as immigration exposed if they are subject to more exposure than the median Swede.

*Exposure by industry.* In the domain of prospective employment competition, we measure the share of (non-nordic) immigrants in each industry, where industries are defined from 5-digit industry codes. If an individual has her main labour income in a given (election) year from an employer in an industry where the share of immigrants is above its median value, we set the her binary indicator for industry immigrant exposure in that year to 1. For those individuals who do not have a labour income above 3.5 Price Base Amounts in an (election) year, we go backwards in the yearly panel to the most recent year with income above this threshold. We then compute the above-mean exposure indicator for the industry in that year.

*Exposure by occupation.* Staying in the domain of employment competition, we measure the share of (non-nordic) immigrants in each occupation, where occupations are defined by 4-digit (SSYK) occupation codes. If an individual has her main labour income in a given (election) year from an occupation, where the immigrant share is above the median across occupations, we set the her binary indicator for occupation immigrant exposure in that year to 1. For those with low incomes from employment in the year, we follow the same procedure as for industry exposure.

*Exposure by welfare recipients.* For prospective fiscal competition, we measure the share of (non-nordic) immigrants among those receiving social-welfare payments in each neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods are defined by the 9,000 SAMS areas. If an individual resides in a neighbourhood where the share of immigrants among welfare payees is above the median value, we set her binary indicator for welfare-recipient immigration exposure to 1.

*Exposure by neighbourhood.* For prospective neighbourhood competition, we measure the share of (non-nordic) immigrants who live in each neighbourhood, where neighbourhoods are again defined by SAMS areas. If an individual resides in a neighbourhood where the immigrant




FIGURE 3

Anti-establishment and anti-immigrant attitudes across categories of outsider status, and immigration exposure.

*Notes:* The graph shows the shares of politicians or voters who say that they have “low trust” or “very low trust” in the national parliament (upper panel), and the shares stating that “Reducing refugee immigration” is a “very good proposal” (lower panel). The voter data come from the (annual) 2004 to 2015 SOM surveys ( $N=46,079$ ), and the politician data from the 2017 KOLFU survey ( $N=7,609$ ). As the KOLFU responses are linked to (some) registers, we can use the same definitions of groups as in the text. Because the SOM survey responses lack linkages to any registers, we use an alternative definition of labour-market outsiders. Relying on the SOM background data, we define a voter as a labour-market outsider if she is employed via a government labour-market program, unemployed, on disability insurance, non-employed, or employed with a low household income. The SOM background data does, however, include occupation and industry, allowing the same definitions of immigrant exposure in these domains as in Section 3.1.

share is above its median value, we set the her binary indicator for neighbourhood immigration exposure to 1.

### 3.3. Views by group

The groups in our classification tree are selected on the assumption that the Sweden Democrat anti-establishment and anti-immigration platform resonate with social and economic outsiders, and with people exposed to immigration. While it is hard to directly validate these assumptions, we can use survey data to shed some light on their plausibility. Politicians in our recent politician survey (KOLFU 2017) gave their informed consent to link responses (anonymously) to some (but not all) registers. These links allow us to classify respondents by some of our binary indicators. The background information in the SOM voter survey allow for the same kind of classification, although with slight methodological modifications (see the notes to Figure 3 for details).

Figure 3 shows the shares of the politician and voter groups in our classification tree who express high distrust in the national parliament (proxying anti-establishment attitudes as in Figure 1)—the upper panel—as well as strong support for reducing refugee immigration (proxying anti-immigration attitudes)—the lower panel. For each dimension, our outsider status

and immigrant exposure categories are represented by black bars, and their counterparts (insiders and non-exposed) in grey or white. Among both politicians and voters, the distrust in parliament as well as the support for reducing immigration is clearly the highest for labour-market outsiders, a bit lower for vulnerable labour-market insiders, and the lowest for secure insiders. Among politicians, the single or divorced lament the establishment and immigration more than the respondents with a partner. The patterns are less clear for immigration exposure, where voters, but not politicians, have stronger anti-immigration attitudes when immigration exposure in their occupations is high. However, we see a slight difference in the expected direction for politicians with high vs. low immigration exposure in their industry.

#### 4. POLITICIANS

This section presents the most novel part of our analysis. We begin by examining nationwide data, assessing how the Sweden Democrat elected municipal councilors compare to the general population and councilors for other established parties. Here, we rely on the 11 binary indicators of individual traits defined in Section 3 and summarized under the headings of outsider status and immigration exposure. Next, we ask which of these traits best predict that an elected politician represents the Sweden Democrats. Based on this (machine-learning) exercise, we single out four predictive traits. Finally, we go to the local level and ask how local Sweden-Democrat and other-party elected politicians adapt to variation across municipalities in the traits of interest.

##### 4.1. *Nationwide selection*

**4.1.1. Methodology.** Figure 4 compares outsider status and immigration exposure across three groups of individuals: the entire population (the hollow bars), elected local representatives from the Sweden Democrats (the black bars) and elected local representatives from all other parties (the grey bars).<sup>13</sup> The shares in this bar graph are computed as an average over the 2002–2014 electoral periods.<sup>14</sup>

A complicating factor is that municipal council size is not proportional to municipal population. The smallest municipality (Bjurholm) has about 100 citizens for each politician, while the largest (Stockholm) has 8,000. A naïve mean comparison of politicians and citizens would therefore largely capture a rural-urban divide. To address this issue, we compute weighted means of our 11 binary indicators that give all municipality-year combinations the same importance. We use the same weights when calculating the median values used in the definitions of outsider status and immigrant exposure. In practice, however, this weighting only makes a difference for immigration exposure, as Sweden's immigrants are mainly concentrated to larger cities.

**4.1.2. Own outsider status.** The leftmost part of Figure 4 plots our four indicators for labour-market and family outsider status. As the hollow bars show, 36% of the (non-student) working-age population are labour-market outsiders and nearly half the labour-market insiders are vulnerable insiders. The black bars in the first two columns show that the Sweden Democrats over-represent labour-market outsiders and vulnerable insiders: roughly 47% and 55% of local

13. We have also performed the analysis in this section on the full ballots of *nominated* candidates, rather than on the candidates elected from these ballots. We present the results in the Supplementary Appendix (Supplementary Figure W3). They are, if anything, stronger with this wider definition of representation. The same qualitative results hold if we look at a narrower group of politicians at the top of each local ballot.

14. Since our individual data ends in 2012, we have to impute an individual's 2014 group status from the 2012 data.




FIGURE 4

Outsider status and immigrant exposure among Sweden-Democrat politicians, other-party politicians, and population.

*Notes:* The figure shows averages for our 11 binary indicators for Sweden-Democrat politicians, politicians in other parties, and the working-age population. The politicians are all municipal councilors elected in 2002, 2006, 2010, or 2014, in pooled cross-sections. The population is pooled cross-sections of all permanent residents in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2012. All averages are calculated with weights that give each municipality-year combination the same importance. Variable definitions appear in Section 3.1. Sweden Democrat  $N = 1,402$ ; Other Parties  $N = 38,911$ ; Population  $N = 19,317,388$ .

councilors belong to these groups. Other parties instead under-represent them, with only 20% of their representatives being labour-market outsiders and 30% of insiders being vulnerable.

The same pattern holds for welfare recipients. The third set of bars in the panel shows that around 8% of Sweden-Democrat politicians receive social welfare, compared to 5% in the general population and just 1% in other parties.

Finally, turning to family type, 40% of the population is single or divorced, and yet 53% of Sweden-Democrat politicians fall into this category. Only about 27% of politicians from other parties are single or divorced.

**4.1.3. Parental outsider status.** The next three sets of bars in Figure 4 distinguish individuals by their parental background. Comparing the father's labour-market outcomes in 1985, we find that Sweden-Democrat politicians over-represent people who grew up with labour-market outsider fathers or in social-welfare receiving households. The other parties severely under-represent those groups.

Similarly large differences appear for the people's family circumstances when growing up: nearly 51% of Sweden-Democrat politicians had divorced parents by the age 18, compared to only 30% for politicians in the other parties.

**4.1.4. How about the left?** One might think that economically marginalized groups would naturally be represented by politicians on the left, even if these parties do not offer anti-establishment or anti-immigration platforms. In Supplementary Appendix, we reproduce Figure 4 for all parties separately (Supplementary Figure W3), including the two traditional left-leaning parties: the Left Party and the Social Democrats. This figure reveals that the left is similar to all other parties in their under-representation of social and economic outsiders. It also shows that the Sweden Democrats do not just distinguish themselves from the average of other parties. They stand in stark contrast to any other party individually.

**4.1.5. Immigration exposure.** The right part of Figure 4 classifies individuals on the basis of their exposure to (non-Nordic) immigration within each of the four domains defined in Section 3.2. As expected, about half of the national population has been exposed to above median levels of immigration across all four categories of immigration exposure.

Politicians in other parties are less often exposed to above-median levels of immigrants in all these categories. For Sweden-Democrat politicians, this is only true at the industry level. For the other three domains of exposure, Sweden Democrats are more likely than the average Swede to experience above-median immigration exposure, but the differences are not as large as for outsider status. When we look at all parties separately in the Supplementary Appendix (Supplementary Figure W3), we find that the immigration exposure of the Sweden-Democrat politicians is highly similar to that of Left-Party and Social-Democrat politicians.

How should we interpret the weaker findings on immigration exposure? We should note that our hypothesis concerns *individual* traits that make some people more exposed than others to competition from immigrants in different dimensions. But direct exposure to a group may also reduce people's hostility. This "contact hypothesis" was put forward already 65 years ago (Allport, 1954) and has also found some empirical support (Dustmann *et al.*, 2017). Are the weak results we find inconsistent with the strong anti-immigration views of Sweden-Democrat politicians and voters (recall Figure 1)? Not necessarily. Bonomi, Gennaioli and Tabellini (2021) present a model of identity politics, in which economic shocks can make a group's cultural identity more salient. Such a theory can also explain why Sweden's economic outsiders, who as we later show were disproportionately affected by an economic reform, may share strong anti-immigrant attitudes, even if exposure to immigrants is not a distinguishing feature of Sweden Democrat politicians.

#### 4.2. Robustness and relative importance

We now address five natural questions about the simple descriptive results in the previous subsection. Are the results robust to the presence of natural controls? Are the results robust to using alternative cutoffs to define individual traits? Do the results reflect supply or demand? Which aspects of outsider status or immigration exposure have most predictive power for who becomes a Sweden-Democrat politician? Do the results hold up when we disaggregate the data from the national to the municipal level?

**4.2.1. Holding constant other characteristics.** While unconditional patterns have descriptive value, the results illustrated in Figure 4 do not account for the uneven spread over space and time of politicians from different parties. If some demographic characteristics are widely expected to correlate with support for the populist right, it is also valuable to control for them. The stereotypical populist-right sympathizer is a (white), relatively young male with low education. Indeed, compared to other parties, the Sweden Democrats candidates are more often under-35 (23 vs. 13%), male (74 vs. 66%), and lacking a tertiary education (75 vs. 52%). Another concern is that the groups in Figure 4 may be closely related to each other and thus pick up the same underlying traits. The full set of pairwise correlations (see Supplementary Appendix Table W2) shows that the groups are indeed related, but far from perfectly so—the strongest pairwise correlation coefficient (except for an almost mechanical one) is a mere 0.25.

Nevertheless, we want to address these concerns. To do so, we estimate the following specification for the full population of politicians:

$$G_{i,t} = \beta^g SD_{i,t} + \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} + \mathbf{O}_{i,t} + \gamma_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^g, \quad (1)$$






FIGURE 5

Estimated differences of group shares in the Sweden Democrats and other parties.

*Notes:* The y-axis shows OLS-regression estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for the difference in the share of each group on the x-axis among Sweden-Democrat politicians and other-party politicians. A value of 0.1 means that a certain group is 10 ppt more common among Sweden-Democrat politicians. Regressions include municipality-election fixed effects—black dots; adding controls among education level (seven dummies), age bracket (six dummies), sex at birth (one dummy)—dark-grey dots; and controls for all the other indicators for the other x-axis indicators (definitions in Section 3.1)—light-grey dots. As most labour-market outsiders and social-welfare recipients lack employment, we cannot include three employment-related indicators (vulnerable insider, immigrant exposure in industry and occupation). Data include all municipal councillors in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 ( $N = 1,402$  Sweden Democrats and  $N = 38,911$  other-party politicians). The number of observations varies slightly across groups. Supplementary Appendix Table W3 shows the full regression output.

where  $G_{i,t}$  denotes a binary indicator for councillor  $i$  in election year  $t$  belonging to group  $g$ , one of the eleven groups in our classification tree.  $SD_{i,t}$  is our main variable of interest, a binary indicator for councillor  $i$  being a Sweden Democrat. To compare the Sweden-Democratic politicians to others elected to the same municipal council in the same election year, all specifications include fixed effects for municipality-election year combinations ( $\gamma_{m,t}$ ). We then add a vector of controls  $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t}$  for sex at birth (one dummy), 10-year age brackets (six dummies), and education level (seven dummies). Another vector of controls  $\mathbf{O}_{i,t}$  then adds the other ten binary variables in the classification tree. Because some indicators have missing data, the number of observations is reduced for some regressions.<sup>15</sup>

In each regression,  $\beta^g$  captures the percentage-point difference in the share of each group among Sweden Democrat politicians vs. other-parties. Figure 5 plots these OLS coefficients associated with three specifications of the regression with their 95% confidence intervals. The black dots show estimates with municipality-year fixed effects, the dark-grey dots with additional demographic controls added, and the light-grey dots with all controls added. Supplementary Appendix Table W3 shows the regression results including all exact observation numbers as well as the raw differences without any fixed effects.

The left part of Figure 5 confirms the over-representation of the four groups of own labour-market and family outsider status in the Sweden Democrats. For three groups (labour-market outsiders, share of vulnerable insiders and share of single or divorced), the estimated within municipality-election year differences are more or less identical to the unconditional gaps at

15. Labour-market outsiders and social welfare recipients tend to not be employed. We therefore do not control for the three characteristics related to one's employment (vulnerable insider, share of immigrants in occupation and industry) in these regressions.

about 25 percentage points (ppt), and substantial gaps of about 15 ppt remain when adding all controls. For social-welfare recipients, the estimated difference in the share is 4 ppt, regardless of the controls included. Taken together, these findings corroborate a pattern of over-representation of economic and social outsiders, which is neither driven by underlying demographic variables, nor by when and where the councilors were elected.

The middle part of Figure 5 shows that the added controls slightly alter the representation patterns for people with parental outsiders. Sweden Democrats appear to have around 5 ppt additional politicians whose father was a labour-market outsider in 1985, regardless of controls. The over-representation among the Sweden Democrats of politicians whose father received social welfare in 1985 falls from 6 to 3 ppt when we add the controls, while the difference in the share with parents that had divorced by the end of adolescence falls from 18 to 12 ppt.

Finally, we turn to the right part of the panel and the results for immigration exposure. The difference in the share of politicians who work in occupations with an above-median share of immigrants remains at about 15 ppt irrespective of controls. For the other three measures of immigration exposure, the differences are near zero and statistically insignificant at conventional levels after adding controls. With the exception of occupational immigrant exposure, politicians from the Sweden Democrats appear to be no different from politicians in other parties.

One may argue that the results for the different indicators are not strictly comparable as they may have different variance.<sup>16</sup> As Supplementary Figure W4 shows, however, the results are similar when we redraw Figure 5 in terms of standardized beta coefficients. The one notable difference is that the estimates for social-welfare recipients—the outsider group that makes up the smallest share of the population—becomes larger than all measures of immigration exposure, making the over-representation of outsiders even stronger.

**4.2.2. Different cutoffs for high immigration exposure.** We have mostly used a simple cutoff at the median of the distribution to define individual traits, especially when it comes to immigration exposure. One may argue that this practice may miss non-linearities at high levels of exposure. To check for this, we have tried different cutoffs for the four immigration exposure variables (replacing the median with, the upper quartile, or the 60th, 70th, 80th, and 90th percentile). The results (available on request) are not dramatically different from those reported in Figure 5.

**4.2.3. Candidate self-selection or party screening?** Supply and demand models for political selection suggest that we might compare traits of nominated and elected politicians to assess the relative importance of individual self-selection (supply) and party screening (demand) in shaping the composition of traits (e.g. Norris and Lovenduski, 1993). We thus add nominated, un-elected politicians to our analysis and compare the patterns of selection presented in Figure 4 for un-elected versus elected candidates (Supplementary Appendix Figure W5). Outsider status is more prevalent among unelected than elected candidates when we measure politicians' own status, but not when we measure parental outsider status. Immigrant exposure is also more common among unelected versus elected politicians. With few exceptions, however, these gaps are similar in size across all parties. This suggests that party screening (the demand side) does not play a major role in producing the lopsided representation that we find.

Further evidence of a relatively greater importance of self-selection (supply) in producing our results comes from replicating Figure 5 for the un-elected politicians (see Supplementary

16. We owe this observation to an anonymous referee.

Appendix Figure W6). The results are almost identical. This implies that the differences in representation patterns between the Sweden Democrats and the other parties are similar when we study the un-elected and elected politicians, which would not be the case if the Sweden Democrats rewarded different traits than other parties.

Our conceptual framework links political mobilization of people with a weak attachment to labour and marriage markets to the core ideological stances of the populist ideology. A different possibility is that people without jobs or marriages have less to lose from employers or spouses objecting to mobilization for a stigmatized party (Art, 2011). While we do not dispute this possibility, it is unlikely that stigma alone is a major driver of our results. The reason is that we find Sweden-Democrat over-representation on traits where stigma ought to be *less* likely. This is true for parental outsider status, where we find over-representation conditional on the politician's own labour and marriage-market traits. We also find over-representation of the vulnerable insider trait, where the expected "cost" of stigma would run in the opposite direction of our findings—that is, it should be higher for vulnerable than secure insiders.<sup>17</sup>

**4.2.4. Which variables are the most important?** Thus far, we have classified Sweden-Democrat politicians on *a priori* assumptions that largely follow the existing literature on voting for the populist radical right. *A posteriori*, we can clearly see that some of these features are more important in predicting who becomes a Sweden Democrat politician. Figure 5 suggests that the four groups most over-represented among Sweden Democrats relative to other parties are all measures of outsider status: labour-market outsiders, vulnerable insiders, the single or divorced, and people who did not grow up in a nuclear family.

To further assess the relative importance of our eleven binary indicators, we rely on a neutral statistical procedure from the literature on machine learning. Because our *a priori* traits are all measured by binary indicators, we implement a Random Forest algorithm (Schonlau and Zou, 2020) on our population of elected politicians. This analysis assigns relative importance to all the included variables, with the most predictive one assigned a score of 1.

We plot the scores of relative importance in Figure 6. The Random Forest gives the highest predictive power to the same four traits that the Sweden Democrats over-represent the most according to Figure 5. The fifth most important trait is having a father who was a labour-market outsider in 1985. But according to Figure 5, this trait is only over-represented by half as much as the four most important traits.

Given these findings and not to overburden the analysis with excessive taxonomies, we will restrict our analysis in the remainder of the paper to the top-four traits that the Sweden Democrats over-represent the most, which were also picked out by the Random Forest. This leaves us with the following classifiers of outsider status: being a labour-market outsider, a vulnerable insider, single or divorced, and growing up with divorced parents.

**4.2.5. Municipal rather than national selection.** Thus far, we have analysed individual data but at a nationwide level. How about if we instead consider representation separately in each of Sweden's 290 municipalities? This is discussed in Section W2 of the Supplementary Appendix, where Supplementary Figure W7 shows political representation across municipalities in a series of "local representation plots" for the four most important outsider groups that we just identified.

17. On the other hand, one can argue that divorced parents may mean potentially fewer close social ties and, as a result, lower stigma for joining the Sweden Democrats. Also, secure insiders may have more to lose than vulnerable insiders in terms of social status and living standards from joining a stigmatized party. We owe these observations to an anonymous referee.




FIGURE 6

Importance scores of predictors for Sweden Democrat elected candidates.

*Notes:* The figure uses the STATA Random Forest algorithm “rforest” (Shonlau and Zou, 2020) to compare the relative predictive accuracy of different variables in a statistical learning analysis, where the objective function is to correctly classify Sweden-Democrat politicians, and the predictors are the 11 traits singled out by the indicators defined in our classification tree (see Figure 3). The dataset consists of all elected municipal councilors from all parties (that are represented in the Swedish national parliament) in four pooled cross sections of politicians elected in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014.

These show that local parties—whether Sweden Democrat or not—do produce more elected politicians among labour-market outsiders and family outsiders (bottom two graphs), as those groups make for a larger share of the municipal population.

But variation in group size across municipalities does *not* directly affect the national patterns beyond random selection. For one group—labour-market outsiders—a larger municipality share does amplify the representation gap between Sweden Democrats and other parties. Overall, however, the national outsider representation gap between Sweden Democrats and other parties is mostly driven by a systematic level-municipal representation premium to outsiders among the Sweden Democrats and a systematic level-municipal representation penalty among other parties.

## 5. VOTERS

So far, we have offered the first comprehensive account of political selection into a populist radical-right party. Taking a starting point in the anti-establishment, anti-immigrant platform that the Sweden Democrats shares with populist radical-right parties around the world, we have shown that the Swedish party predominately over-represents individuals from economic and social outsider groups. We have based this analysis on rich individual-level administrative data.

In this section, we expand upon the existing literature on voting for the populist radical right and ask if the patterns of politician selection find echo in more aggregate voting data. In particular, we rely on the four most important traits for outsider status identified by the politician analysis in Section 4.2.

By the mobilization argument in Section 3, we expect people with one of these traits to more likely cast their ballot for the Sweden Democrats. Our first question is thus straightforward. Do the Sweden Democrats, on average, get a higher vote share in places where a higher share of people have that trait? Our second question is more indirect. Does our outsider-status approach also shed light on the particular time patterns of the party’s local growth?




FIGURE 7

Sweden-Democrat vote shares across precincts within municipalities.

*Notes:* The figure shows correlations between the Sweden-Democrat vote share and four characteristics of local populations. These are the same as our four chosen categories in the politician analysis: the share of labour-market outsiders (top left), the share of vulnerable insiders (top right), the share single or divorced (bottom left), and the share whose parents had divorced when the child was 18 (bottom right). Section 3.2 details those variables. The level of observation is the voting precinct-election year. We use three pooled cross sections of election years (2002, 2006, and 2010),  $N = 17,427$ . The scatter plots include interacted fixed effects for municipality and election year so that the y-axis shows precinct deviations from the municipality-mean within election years, and the x-axis shows deviations from the municipality mean. Bins are set to a fixed number of observations ( $N = 50$ ).

### 5.1. Average precinct voting

For the first analysis, we aggregate individual characteristics to the level of a precinct in a particular election year. Sweden has about 5,600 precincts—the lowest units at which election results are recorded. Precincts are contained within municipalities and have an average population of about 1,200 people.

In Figure 7, we plot the relationship between the Sweden-Democrat vote share and the share of each of the four chosen outsider groups, one by one. To obtain the observations and the regression line, we use data from three election years, namely 2002, 2006, and 2010.<sup>18</sup> For each of our measures, we hold constant municipality-election-year fixed effects, such that the y-axis shows vote-share deviations from the municipality by election-year mean. A dot in each scatter plot corresponds to a binned average over 50 observations. Note also the common scale on vertical axes in each of the four plots, which makes the regression-line slopes easier to compare.

**5.1.1. Labour-market outsider status.** In Section 4, we saw that elected Sweden-Democrat councilors systematically over-represent marginalized labour-market groups. The first and second plots in Figure 7 show analogous relationships for the party's electoral support. In other words, the Sweden Democrats saw larger vote shares in municipalities with larger shares of labour-market outsiders and vulnerable insiders (relative to the municipal-year-specific mean).

18. The precinct delineations for 2014 are unavailable in our data.

The within-municipality slope coefficients between the Sweden-Democrat vote share and the precinct shares of labour-market outsiders and vulnerable insiders are 0.029 (se = 0.001) and 0.086 (se = 0.001), respectively. A 20 ppt higher share of labour-market outsiders in the voting precinct relative to the municipality mean is associated with a 0.6 ppt higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats. Similarly, a 20 ppt higher share of vulnerable insiders is associated with a 1.7 ppt higher vote share.

**5.1.2. Family outsider status.** The bottom panels of Figure 7 show similar patterns for the two family-outsider groups. The Sweden Democrats receive more votes in precincts with higher shares of single or divorced individuals, or with higher shares of individuals who grew up with divorced parents. These precinct associations are also precisely estimated. The correlation between the Sweden-Democrat vote share and the population share having grown up with divorced parents is 0.093 (se = 0.003), while the correlation with single or divorced inhabitants is 0.014 (se = 0.001). A 20 ppt higher share that are divorced or single in the voting precinct relative to the municipality mean is associated with a 0.3 ppt higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats. Similarly, a 20 ppt higher share growing up with divorced parents is associated with a 1.8 ppt higher vote share.

**5.1.3. Bottom line.** In sum, the four outsider-group indicators picked out as the strongest predictors of who becomes a Sweden-Democrat politician also correlate strongly with Sweden-Democrat vote shares across precincts. These correlations are not only strong bilaterally. In a multivariate analysis of vote shares, three of the four largest coefficients on the group indicators belong to vulnerable labour-market insiders, having divorced parents, and being a labour-market outsider (see Supplementary Appendix Table W4).

## 5.2. *Widened gaps and municipal voting*

We have seen that the prevalence of our outsider groups in the population correlate with the general success of the Sweden Democrats. Does this approach also shed light on the timing of the party's electoral success? The Sweden-Democrat vote shares doubled both in the 2006–10 and 2010–14 electoral periods. Based on the argument in Section 3, a natural trigger would be an event that widens the status gap between outsider and insider groups, thus deepening tensions between them and mobilizing new politicians and voters for the party. (This is related to the general reasoning in papers like Algan *et al.*, 2017).

No obvious triggers stand out for own or parental family outsider status. The share of single and divorced increased during our sample period, but the increase was marginal. The share of single and divorced went from 42.3% in 2002 to 43.5% in 2008, came to a halt with the financial recession, and re-assumed its upward trend in 2011 and 2012, reaching 44.5% at the end of the sample. Our other family outsider trait—divorced parents by age 18—is by definition predetermined for today's politicians and voters. By contrast, two dramatic national events widened the status gap between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. We now describe these events and show that the local variation in the success of Sweden Democrats correlates strongly with the local effects of these national shocks.<sup>19</sup>

19. Of course, being single rather than partnered could interact with the economic shocks studied below—e.g., more-than-one-person households could offer insurance against income shocks. In our data, the correlation coefficient between singles and outsiders is 0.15 and between singles and vulnerable insider is 0.08 (see the pairwise correlations in Supplementary Table W2). Unfortunately, there is no straightforward way to investigate such interaction dynamics with our data.




FIGURE 8

National shocks to the disposable income of labour-market outsiders and unemployment of vulnerable insiders and relations between Local Sweden-Democrat vote shares and local inequalities created by these shocks.

*Notes:* The top-left graph shows national trends in real average pre-tax and disposable incomes for labour-market insiders and outsiders (relative to their 2002 levels). The bottom-left graph shows national trends in the risk of receiving unemployment benefits for those we classify as secure and vulnerable labour-market insiders in 2006. For details about these inequality measures, see Section 5.2. The top- and bottom-right graphs show estimates from shift-share reduced-form regressions for the local (municipal) Sweden-Democrat vote share with their 95% confidence intervals. In the top-right regressions, the shift is the national income gap (shown in the top-left graph) and the shares are the local shares of outsiders. In the bottom-right regressions, the shift is the national unemployment gap (shown in the bottom-left graph) and the share is the local share of vulnerable insiders. The two leftmost estimates in each of these graphs come from regressions that rely on the contemporaneous local shares, while the two rightmost estimates instead rely on 2006 local shares.  $N = 11,060$  municipality-election year observations, and all regressions include fixed effects for these combinations. Supplementary Appendix Table W5 shows the exact regression estimates, numbers of observations, and other statistics.

**5.2.1. The 2006–11 make-work pay reforms.** The new centre-right government that took over in 2006 enacted an ambitious reform agenda “to make work pay”. People with a stable job earned higher net incomes due to five annual installments (2007–11) of an Earned Income Tax Credit. To finance this program, the government rolled back various social programs and unemployment benefits, which mainly hit people without stable jobs. The effects of these reforms was thus a wider *disposable-income* gap between labour-market insiders and outsiders.<sup>20</sup> We can see this clearly in the top-left panel of Figure 8. Average disposable incomes among labour-market insiders rose by approximately 10% over the 2006–12 period, while in contrast,

20. The idea that a fiscal austerity program may cause protest against the political establishment is related to Fetzer (2019).

average disposable incomes among labour-market outsiders fell by 10%. By 2012, the last year of our income data, the gap had gone up by over 20 ppt from 2006.<sup>21</sup>

Did the financial crisis in 2008 drive this widening gap? The figure shows that the pre-tax income of labour-market outsiders did not suffer in the 2006–8 period, but their disposable income trailed that of insiders, reflecting the policy programs. The years 2009 and 2010 do see outsiders getting much lower pre-tax incomes, reflecting the crisis. By 2010, the pre-tax income of outsiders recovers to previous levels, erasing the temporary effects of the financial crisis, but the disposable income does not, reflecting the permanent effects of the policy reforms.

**5.2.2. The 2008–10 financial crisis.** While the financial crisis did not drive the gap in disposable income between labour-market insiders and outsiders, it did affect relative unemployment risks. The bottom-left panel of Figure 8 illustrates how the financial crisis drastically raised the relative unemployment risk of vulnerable insiders vs. secure insiders in the labour market. To draw the graph, we start from all working-age people who had a stable job in 2006 and classify those into vulnerable and secure insiders, as in the main analysis. We then graph the share in each of these groups that received non-zero unemployment benefits, both before and after 2006. Interpreting such shares as a proxy for job-loss risk, the figure shows a rising risk gap after the crisis, which had far from closed when our data ends.

**5.2.3. Shift-share specification.** We would now like to estimate how the within-municipality growth of the Sweden Democrats relates to the within-municipality changes in the inequalities of disposable incomes and unemployment risks:

$$I_{m,t}^Y = \frac{N_{m,t}^O}{N_{m,t}} \cdot G_t^Y \quad \text{and} \quad I_{m,t}^U = \frac{N_{m,t}^V}{N_{m,t}^I} \cdot G_t^U. \quad (2)$$

Here,  $\frac{N_{m,t}^O}{N_{m,t}}$  and  $\frac{N_{m,t}^V}{N_{m,t}^I}$  are the *municipal shares* of labour-market Outsiders and Vulnerable insiders, respectively, either in the current year or some initial year (see below). The variables  $G_t^Y$  and  $G_t^U$  are related to the *national shifts* in disposable incomes and unemployment risk, as plotted in the left panels of Figure 8. Because national shifts are more plausibly exogenous than the local ones, our inequality measures are more plausibly exogenous than those based on actual municipal shifts. (That said, our results do hold up when we use municipal shifts—see Panel B in Supplementary Appendix Table W5.)

To estimate the relationship between the Sweden-Democrat vote share,  $vs_{m,t}$  in municipality  $m$  and election  $t$ , and the two inequality measures, we use the shift-share specification

$$vs_{m,t} = \alpha + \beta^Y I_{m,t}^Y + \beta^U I_{m,t}^U + \eta_t + \delta_m + \varepsilon_{m,t}, \quad (3)$$

where  $I_{m,t}^Y$  and  $I_{m,t}^U$  are given by the expressions in (2)<sup>22</sup>. To remove the average time trend in the Sweden-Democrat vote share, we include election-period fixed effects,  $\eta_t$ . To focus on within-municipality variation, we include municipality fixed effects,  $\delta_m$ . We cluster the standard errors at

21. A small increase in this gap happened already before the 2006 change in government, likely due to cutbacks in unemployment insurance carried out by the Social Democratic government in that period.

22. However, we do not consider (3) with the inequalities given by (2) as a valid instrumental-variable specification, because the exclusion restriction may not be fulfilled.



the municipality level. Finally, to simplify the interpretation of our estimates we transform each inequality measure into a  $z$ -score.

To argue more credibly that the two economic events did not mainly raise the support of the Sweden Democrats by changing the composition of the population, we re-run the analysis when the inequalities  $I_{m,t}^Y$  and  $I_{m,t}^U$  are based on the 2006 shares of each outsider group rather than the current shares.

**5.2.4. Shift-share estimates.** The right panels of Figure 8 show our estimates for income inequality (at the top) and for unemployment inequality (at the bottom)—Panel A in Supplementary Appendix Table W5 gives the full estimates, standard errors and sample sizes for the regressions. In each of these graphs, the first marker shows the estimate when we include each inequality separately, while the second marker shows the estimate when we include both inequalities jointly. The two right-most estimates are based on the 2006 local group shares rather than the contemporaneous local group shares.

The first estimate in the top-right panel thus shows the correlation of the Sweden-Democrat vote share with the income inequality between labour-market outsiders and insiders as driven by the national policy shifts in the top-left panel. The effect is positive and precisely estimated. A one-standard-deviation increase in income inequality is associated with a 1.1 ppt higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats.

The first estimate in the bottom-right panel shows an even stronger relationship with the inequality in unemployment risk. A one-standard-deviation increase in unemployment-risk inequality is associated with a 2.5 ppt higher Sweden-Democrat vote share. When we include the two inequalities jointly, the estimates barely change.

The correlations are not only precisely estimated but also numerically large. As outsider-group shares vary considerably across municipalities and the trigger events changed both national inequalities by one to two standard deviations, one can ascribe a substantial portion of the variation in Sweden-Democrat growth across municipalities to these events.

When we use the pre-event (rather than current) shares of labour-market outsiders and vulnerable insiders, the coefficients of interest both double in size. This suggests that the changes in Sweden-Democrat electoral support associated with the make-work-pay reforms and the financial-crisis recession indeed reflect higher support in particular population segments, and not changes in the population composition.

## 6. TAKING STOCK

In this section, we try to take stock of our findings. First, we offer an interpretation in terms of descriptive representation by citizen candidates, and offer some additional evidence in favour of this interpretation. Then, we ask whether the increased representation of outsider groups following the rise of the Sweden Democrats may also have a drawback in terms of valence.

### 6.1. *Citizen-candidate interpretation*

We have seen that the Sweden Democrats represent certain outsider groups in the population, consistent with their anti-establishment program. In addition, the Sweden Democrats receive higher electoral support from precincts with higher shares of these outsider groups. Together, these findings suggest a citizen-candidate interpretation (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Given an inability to commit to electoral platforms—a shortcoming that

perhaps is particularly salient for voters with low trust in politicians—a shared trait like outsider labour-market status credibly signals to voters that the candidate will represent them faithfully.<sup>23</sup>

**6.1.1. Shared political attitudes.** A central building block of the citizen-candidate model is that people enter into politics to pursue policies that benefit them, and by extension, those with similar traits. When policy interests are determined by socioeconomic traits, politicians and voters who share such traits will also share political attitudes. This rhymes well with our survey evidence presented in Figure 1. Not only do Sweden Democrat politicians and voters share views against the establishment and immigration, but these views stand in stark contrast from those of politicians and voters in other parties. The similarity in traits and attitudes among Sweden Democrats—and the distance in both traits and attitudes from all other parties—also explain why these outsiders did not turn to a left-wing party.

**6.1.2. Downsian opportunistic candidates?** A citizen-candidate interpretation would be implausible if the Sweden Democrats comprised purely opportunistic politicians who reshuffled themselves from other parties. Voters would hardly believe in a stable tie from traits to attitudes for politicians who abandon a mainstream party for a populist radical-right alternative.

We can look at this issue in our ballot data since the 1982 election (10 elections in total). As many as 90% of Sweden-Democrat local councilors have never appeared on a list for another party, and 98% have never been elected for another party. The corresponding numbers are much lower for the other parties (results available upon request). Thus, Sweden-Democrat politicians do not look like opportunistic (office-motivated) candidates, who become Sweden Democrats because they did not succeed in other parties.

**6.1.3. New parties and outsiders.** An alternative interpretation is that our findings reflect a new-party phenomenon. After all, new parties may enter precisely to cater for previously under-represented groups. Apart from the Sweden Democrats, three new parties won seats in the Swedish parliament during the period covered by our data. Two non-populist parties, one Green/Ecological and one Conservative (the Christian Democrats) entered parliament in 1988 and 1991, respectively. A third, populist anti-establishment party called New Democracy was formed only 6 months before the 1991 election, won parliamentary seats in that election, but failed in the 1994 election and disintegrated soon thereafter. As such, it offers an interesting comparison to the Sweden Democrats, but New Democracy is not an example of a populist radical-right party that managed to solidly establish itself in national and local politics.

In Supplementary Appendix, we study political selection into these parties (Supplementary Figure W8) as well as their voting outcomes in the election year that they entered parliament (Supplementary Figure W9). Results show that none of the other new parties came to consistently over-represent the various outsider groups in the same way the Sweden Democrats did. On the contrary, the Greens and Christian Democrats over-represented labour-market insiders, and all three of these other new parties over-represented secure insiders. The Green party and the Christian Democrats over-represented people who live in nuclear families. A tentative interpretation is that the over-representation of outsider groups is not a phenomenon of all new parties. An important question for future research is whether the over-representation of outsider groups extends to consolidated populist right-parties, and possibly also to inclusionary populist left-parties that combine populism and socialism.

23. A related mechanism is that voters find it is easier to trust candidates that look more like themselves. This possibility is part of the argument in Guiso and Makarin (2020).




FIGURE 9

Traits of Sweden-Democrat Councilors vs. Other-party Councilors.

*Notes:* The y-axis shows the difference between Sweden-Democrat politicians and other-party politicians for the valence trait marked on the x-axis, expressed in terms of standard deviations (among politicians) of that trait. Data for political experience, public-sector experience, years of education, and earnings scores comes from administrative registers for municipal councilors elected in 2002 to 2014. Data for public-service motivation, and honesty-humility come from the 2017 KOLFU survey (sources for the different survey instruments are detailed in the text). Regressions are run with municipality-election fixed effects—black dots; added controls for education level (seven dummies), age bracket (six dummies), sex at birth (one dummy)—dark-grey dots; and added controls for all the other indicators for social and economic outsider groups and immigrant exposure (definitions in Section 3.1)—light-grey dots. Due to a lack of parental links in the KOLFU-data, traits based on parental data are not included. For exact coefficients, standard errors, and numbers of observations, see Supplementary Appendix Table W6.

## 6.2. Valence costs?

The rise of the Sweden Democrats suggests a notable plasticity of Sweden's democracy. As discussed in Sections 4 and 5, the new party gave voice to previously under-represented outsider groups in Swedish society. But a frequent question mark by political philosophers (e.g. Phillips Griffiths and Wollheim, 1960; Pitkin, 1967) is that politicians who offer such “descriptive representation” may be less able to perform the tasks to “effectively represent their voters”, e.g. if these politicians have lower valence. As a result, politicians who deliver more descriptive representation may deliver less “substantive representation”.

Does the rise of the Sweden Democrats entail a tradeoff of this kind? Specifically, do politicians in the Sweden Democrats differ from those of other political parties when we move beyond traits that make them economic and social outsiders to individual traits that reflect their valence?

**6.2.1. Six valence traits.** Figure 9 compares politicians from different parties on six traits chosen to approximate an aptitude for local politics. All are measured in standard deviations to facilitate interpretation.

Four traits are measured with administrative data. The first is public sector experience, defined as the number of years with public employment out of the last 12 years. The second is previous experience holding political office, measured as the number of previous terms in elected office (dating back to 1982), and the third is years of education. The fourth trait is the so-called earnings score, an ability measure developed by Besley, Folke, Persson and Rickne (2017) on the basis of residuals estimated from a rich Mincer equation for the whole population.

Two traits are measured with the KOLFU-survey of roughly 7,000 municipal politicians. Public-service motivation is gauged by the so-called Perry score, which is based on a battery

of questions about private vs. altruistic motives (Kim, Vandenabeele, Wright, Andersen, Cerase, Christensen, Desmarais, Koumenta, Leisink, Liu, Palidauškaite, Pedersen, Perry, Ritz, Taylor and De Vivo, 2012). Lastly, we use the HEXACO module of questions developed by social psychologists Lee and Ashton (2004) to construct an index for morality (the Honesty-Humility score).

**6.2.2. Estimating differences.** We examine the difference in valence traits between the Sweden Democrats and politicians from other parties using exactly the same three specifications as in Figure 5. In the first specification, we include municipality-election year fixed effects only. Each politician has a bundle of attributes and, descriptively, these unconditional coefficients accurately capture differential valence across parties.

In the second specification, we add controls for sex, age, and education (excluding the education control when education is the outcome), and in the third specification we add controls for 8 of our 11 measures of outsider status and immigration exposure traits (due to a lack of parental links in the KOLFU-data, we cannot control for the three parental traits). The conditional coefficients are of analytic rather than descriptive interest. They let us assess if selection is positive or negative, conditional on a particular trait.

**6.2.3. Estimated differences: description.** For all traits, except honesty and humility, average valence of the Sweden Democrats falls behind that in other parties by at least 0.6 standard deviations. These valence gaps remain substantive and statistically significant also with the full set of controls. For honesty and humility, the unconditional coefficient is significant and shows the Sweden Democrats trailing other-party politicians by around 0.25 standard deviations.<sup>24</sup>

**6.2.4. Estimated differences: positive or negative selection?** Adding control variables helps explore whether the Sweden Democrats' over-representation of marginalized citizens produce the negative valence-gaps vis-a-vis other parties reflected in the unconditional coefficients in Figure 9. For example, the gap in Honesty-Humility decreases as we add controls and becomes insignificant in the most saturated specification, suggesting no moral negative selection once one conditions on all other individual traits.

It may not come as a surprise that we find the largest difference for political experience, since we study a new party with few politicians previously representing other parties. Though the Sweden-Democrat lower earnings score partly reflects a larger share of labour-market outsiders, a negative gap in this variable of about 0.4 standard deviations remains when adding controls for possessing that outsider trait.

For the earnings score and years of education, we can take this analysis one step further and compare the selection from the working-age population *within* groups. The results (see Supplementary Appendix Table W7) show that other parties produce a positive draw from each group of labour-market and family outsiders, as well as from the categories of immigration exposure. This replicates the general finding of positive selection even within socially disadvantaged groups in Dal Bó *et al.* (2017), which we termed “inclusive meritocracy”. By contrast, conditional on the same outsider groups the Sweden Democrats offer, if anything, negative selection.

24. These valence differences among politicians for populist and non-populist parties are related to the differences among voters for populist and non-populist parties in Durante, Pinotti and Tesei (2019).

**6.2.5. Bottom line.** The comparisons in this section show that the Sweden Democrats do not just represent other groups in society than the established parties. Their representatives carry different motivations and qualifications.<sup>25</sup> So Sweden-Democrat politicians may share their voters' attitudes and socioeconomic traits, but—in the language of political philosophy—such descriptive representation need not imply substantive representation due to a representation-valence tradeoff.

## 7. FINAL REMARKS

The global rise of the populist radical right is perhaps the most important political phenomenon in the last couple of decades. Our article relies on unique individual data to describe the politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats, a highly successful populist radical-right party. We draw upon insights from social psychology to delineate groups that may be particularly receptive to the Sweden Democrats' anti-establishment and anti-immigrant program.

Our findings are strictly descriptive. Sweden Democrat politicians over-represent social and economic outsiders in the population, whereas other-party politicians under-represent those groups. The same over-representation does not show up as clearly among people who are personally exposed to immigration. Taken together, our findings show the Sweden Democrats in a very specific light, reflecting both potential strengths and weaknesses of a democratic political system.

On the one hand, the Sweden Democrats descriptively represent groups of voters—especially those marginalized in the labour market—whose relative position has deteriorated, and who have lost faith in the political establishment. This reflects a democratic system that may get stronger by adjusting its representation patterns as social fortunes, and the conditions for credible representation, change. In the world of identity politics, policy stances may become credible when entering candidates share the socioeconomic traits of voters, and thus appear committed to representing them faithfully. Indeed, our survey data uncover how central political attitudes on immigration and the establishment coincide among Sweden-Democrat voters and politicians.

On the other hand, we show that the Sweden Democrats may weaken the political system in which they grew. Populist radical-right politicians score lower than other-party politicians on a broad set of skills. On “hard” skills like education or public-sector experience, this may be a natural consequence of outsider representation. But on the “soft” skills of public-service motivation (and perhaps morality), the lower scores of the Sweden Democrats—not common to all outsiders—do bear on the ongoing debate about populism and democracy. Populist radical-right parties may offer a voice for marginalized groups, but if they gain power their anti-government stance and lower soft skills may negatively affect government function.

We believe that our description of Sweden-Democrat politicians and voters might serve as a stepping stone for further research. To the extent one finds similar results for populist radical-right parties in other countries, future efforts should delve deeper into theoretical modelling and empirical identification of causal effects. These efforts might include examining how bonds of credibility are forged in political systems, when exactly parties enter and exit the political scene, and which role social media plays in party mobilization.

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25. Of course, the Sweden-Democrat politicians make up a particular selection of social and economic outsiders and some of their traits may not be representative for outsiders at large.

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### Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are available at *Review of Economic Studies* online. And the replication packages are available at <https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6560386>.

### Data Availability Statement (DAS)

All the code, as well as instructions for how to obtain the data, underlying this research are available on Zenodo at <https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6560386> <<https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6560386>>.

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